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It is the object of considerable debate in Western scholarship whether an 
authoritarian political order dominated by a strong communist party can 
continue to exist in China given the many challenges stemming from internal 
reform and the impact of globalization. Will China eventually turn democratic 
and will the communist party become obsolete and disappear, just as has 
happened in many other former communist countries. There seems to be a 
general consensus that Chinese political system is bound to change, but there 
is no agreement as to the direction and form of change. 
 
The various views on China’s political future can be divided into three schools: 
“Evolution to Democracy” School; “Fragile/Collapse” School, and the 
“Resilient Authoritarianism” School. 
 
Scholars belonging to the “Evolution to Democracy” School argue that China 
sooner or later will evolve into a democracy. 1 They disagree among each 
other on the pace of the process, but are in agreement on the end result. 
Although they disagree on the pace of the transition to democracy, they are 
unanimous in viewing the process as an evolution, rather than a violent 
rupture or break. The result will be the disappearance of the CPC and the 
emergence of a political system with free elections. This school operates 
within the so-called transition paradigm which posits that once a country 
moves away from dictatorial rule there is a linear process towards pluralism 
and democracy.  
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According to Carothers five core assumptions define the transition paradigm. 
The first is that any country moving away from dictatorial rule is a country in 
transition towards democracy.2 The second assumption is that the transition 
towards democracy (democratization) unfolds in a sequence of stages. First 
there is the “opening”, a period in which cracks appear in the ruling dictatorial 
regime, with the most prominent crack being a cleavage between hardliners 
and softliners. Second there follows a “breakthrough” with the collapse of the 
regime and the emergence of a new democratic system and the 
establishment of new democratic institutional structures (e.g. a new 
constitution). Third comes “consolidation”, a slow process of transforming 
democratic forms into democratic substance through elections, the reform of 
state institutions and the strengthening of civil society. The introduction of 
elections is crucial, as they will bring about a broadening and deepening of 
political participation.  
 
The fourth assumption is that basic and underlying conditions in the 
transitional countries – i.e. political traditions, institutional legacies, ethnic 
make-up, religious beliefs, and cultural background – will not be major factors 
in determining the outcome of the transition process. The fifth assumption is 
that democratic transitions are being built on coherent and functioning states.3 
 
Carothers maintains that most transitional countries do not conform to these 
assumptions.4 They instead enter a gray zone where they are neither clearly 
dictatorial nor clearly headed towards democracy. They get stuck in the 
transition process, so to speak. Two broad political syndromes seem to be 
common in the gray zone. The first is “feckless pluralism”, where political 
participation extends little beyond voting and democracy remains shallow and 
shaky. The other is “dominant-power politics”. In dominant-power countries 
there is a blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party and the 
state’s assets (jobs, public funding, information, coercive power, etc.) are at 
the service of the ruling party.5 Carother also argues that the assumption that 
democratic transitions are built on coherent states overlooks that often state-
building is an integral part of the transition process. 
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On the surface China fits the transition paradigm. There are cracks in the 
system and it is not difficult to discern hardliners and softliners in the political 
discourse as it unfolds in the state media and among intellectuals; direct 
elections for the position as village head have been instituted at the local level 
in the countryside; state institutions have been reformed; civil society has 
expanded; etc. However, the  process of political reform has not been linear, 
rather it has formed a zigzag pattern or a pattern of two step forward and one 
step back. Moreover, China is clearly a country where a dominant party 
controls the state and its main assets. In sum, the Chinese experience 
actually challenges the transition paradigm in the sense that China seems to 
be fixed in a zone of dominant-power politics rather than in a continuous and 
linear process of democratisation.  The transitology theory does not fit 
Chinese reality. 
 
The Fragile/Collapse School 
Adherents of the “Collapse” School maintain that the current political system 
in China is bound to collapse.6 They argue that the Party has lost its 
legitimacy and will be swept away. Some scholars in this group are worried 
that the collapse will be violent and chaotic due to built up tensions and 
grievances. Related to this school is a “Fragile” School, which maintains that 
the Chinese political system is brittle and fragile and therefore easily can 
experience a break-down.7 
 
Minxin Pei is an interesting example of the “collapse” school.8 He argues that 
China is stuck in the middle. In his mind that there is no transition to speak of, 
as China is trapped in a system which he alternatively labels a development 
autocracy, a decentralized predatory state or a cleptocracy. This is a system 
where the agents of the state are engaged in rent-seeking, corruption and 
collusion to benefit themselves, their families and their friends. Collusive 
networks of corrupt officials, often working together with organized criminal 
groups, are emerging in many parts of China. They form local mafia states 
that undermine the central state power and will ultimately cause the regime to 
collapse.  
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Minxin Pei highlights what he calls the erosion of state capacity in China by 
discussing the Chinese government’s performance in several critical areas: 
taxation, health and education, enforcement of laws and rules, etc. In all these 
areas he sees a decline of state capacity. He also argues that the CCP is 
suffering a decline. He sees this evidenced in the shrinkage of the Party’s 
organizational penetration, in the erosion of its authority and in the breakdown 
of its internal discipline.  
 
In short Minxin Pei argues that this system will eventually collapse as it has no 
legitimacy. It will not be able to sustain the pressure from globalization and 
internal change. But unlike the adherents of  the “evolution to democracy” 
school he is not clear on what will follow the breakdown of the system. Minxin 
Pei’s interpretation of “China’s trapped transition” also does not seem to fit 
Chinese reality. The system has not broken down and in fact seems stronger 
and more consolidated than at any time since 1989. 
 
The “Resilient Authoritarianism” School 
The “Resilient Authoritarianism” School contends that the Chinese political 
system is stable and that the Party is not going to go away in the near future.9 
On the contrary, as a consequence of renewal and revitalization, the Party 
appears to have consolidated its grip over Chinese society. The Party 
organization has proved to be adaptable to new circumstances created by 
economic reform and the emergence of new social groups. 
 
The concept of “resilient authoritarianism” was originally put forward by 
Andrew Nathan, who has no sympathy for the Chinese political system, but 
has realized its resilience. In recent years the “resilient authoritarianism” 
school has gained traction. In 2004 Zheng Yongnian and the present author 
published a book focussing on the CCP and its organizational renewal.  
Scholars such as David Shambaugh and Bruce Dickson who previously would 
argue that the CCP was losing its capacity and legitimacy to rule and was 
experiencing steady decay are now also emphasizing the resilience of the 
system.  
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The Chinese political system is dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. 
A change in the system would entail fundamental changes of the role of the 
CCP and vice versa. Such change was predicted in the early 1989-1990 in 
the wake of the Tian Anmen Massacre, when many scholars predicted that 
Chinese Communist Party would disintegrate as it has lost its legitimacy. This 
scenario was further reinforced with the implosion of the Soviet state and the 
Soviet Communist Party’s loss of power. Impressed by these events, Western 
China scholarship began to focus on civil society, private sector development, 
central-local tensions, migrants, and other marginalized groups – in short on 
the centrifugal forces in Chinese society rather than on the forces that hold 
the system together and make it work. 
 
However, the system did not break down and the CCP did not disappear. In 
fact, by the early 2000s it became clear that the Party had in fact undergone a 
process of renewal and revitalization. As a result of this process the Party and 
its governing apparatus were much younger, better qualified and technically 
more competent than during the Mao era. A few statistics suffice to prove this 
point. 10 
 
In 1979 only 29 percent of Chinese cadres were below 35 years of age. This 
percentage has now risen to more than 50 percent. The share of cadres 
between 36 and 54 years of age has fallen from 65 percent in 1979 to 45 
percent today.  
 
The educational level of cadres has improved dramatically since the 
beginning of the reform period in 1979. The share of cadres with junior middle 
school education and below was almost 50 percent in 1979, now this share of 
less educated cadres has gone down to less than 8 percent. Among leading 
cadres, the share of people with a university degree has increased from 16 
percent in 1979 to more than 80 percent. Now more than 95 percent of the 
Central Committee holds a college degree and an increasing number of top 
leaders even hold a PhD.   
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The change to a younger and better educated cadre corps is associated with 
rigorous training courses for Chinese officials. Now the rule is that Chinese 
officials must have at least 3 months of training within a five year period. For 
many officials training and educational courses at Party schools or training 
centres in China and abroad is a precondition for advancing in the system. 
 
New guidelines and regulations have been adopted with stipulations 
concerning open appointment and selection of cadres and filling of official 
positions and examination. These include a public notification system for filling 
positions below ting-level and experiments with multi-candidate elections for 
leading government and party posts; regular job rotation from section level 
and above; strengthening the supervision of cadres by introducing clear 
measures for performance evaluations combined with public feedback on the 
quality of work done. There are also flexible remuneration and pecuniary 
rewards to high performers. 
 
Chinese politics have been much more institutionalized. For example a rule 
has been introduced concerning age limits for membership of top Party 
organs such as the politbureau and politbureau standing committee. Thus 
politbureau members who are 70 years of age or close to 70 cannot be re-
elected to these important Party organs. A tenure system has been 
introduced, so that a Chinese official only can work two terms (2 x 5 years) in 
the same position. This also applies to top positions such as prime minister or 
president.  Moreover, competitive elements have been introduced into the 
system. This is not only the case at the grass roots level where village leaders 
now are elected in open elections with multiple candidates competing. It is 
also the case at the top of the system, where polls are taken to estimate the 
support of candidates for leadership positions. For example was Xi Jinping’s 
elevation to the position as heir apparent the result of a straw poll among 300 
Chinese top leaders. In the poll Xi Jinping received more support than Li 
Keqiang, who was widely regarded as Hu Jintao’s favourite.  In general, unlike 
in Libya or North Korea, Chinese leaders do not have a monopoly on power 
and they cannot directly pass on the rein of power to loyal followers, let alone 
to their own sons and daughters.  There is a growing body of regulations 
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detailing leadership selection and appointment and what kind of qualifications 
Chinese officials and leaders must possess. All this has contributed to the 
consolidation of the Chinese political system and made it even more resilient. 
 
Democracy versus Authoritarianism 
The current political system in China is characterized by the absence of 
democratic institutions in the form of competing parties and open elections. 
Elections are not viewed as a viable route to power.  Major opposition is not 
allowed and there are in fact no channels for coordinated articulation of 
opposition. The system is also characterized by a low level of uncertainty. 
 
Such a system can be defined as authoritarianism. However the following 
elements have been introduced which have created a system of softened 
authoritarianism. For example, elections have been introduced at the local 
level. Moreover, there is an increasing debate and pluralism within the Party.  
As mentioned leadership positions are increasingly being filled based on open 
announcement and democratic consultation. In general a process of 
professionalization and normativization has created a more transparent and 
predictable political system. But is it democratic or a resultat of a democratic 
process? 
 
There are many definitions of democracy. In this context I define democracy 
as a system that posseses the following characteristics: (i) free elections; (ii) 
broad protection of civil liberties; (iii) level playing field. A system that violates 
at least one of these three defining attributes cannot be labelled a democratic 
system. For example a system that has free elections and protects civil 
liberties is still authoritarian if the playing field is heavily skewed in favour of 
the incumbents. There is competition in such a system, but competition is 
unfair. So what we have is a hybrid system of competitive authoritarianism.11  
 
Is competitive authoritarianism a transition to democracy or a system that is 
stuck in the middle? In a Singaporean context it would be considered an end 
result and in fact a superior model, whereas an anglo-saxon discourse would 
regard it as a transitional phase towards democracy. The Chinese 
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experimentation with free elections is in fact within the framework of 
competitive authoritarianism. For example are village elections heavily 
skewed in favour of the incumbent, namely local cadres and party officials. 
 
The notion of “fragmented authoritarianism” also denotes that the Chinese 
polity is not a monolithic entity ruled by an all-powerful Party. 12 It is in fact a 
fragmented system consisting of various subsystems which compete for 
influence and budget allocations. Within the economic arena, a 
corporatization process has taken place resulting in the emergence of large 
business groups that operate according to market conditions. Thus they 
represent forces and interests that have a fragmented impact on the 
centralized power system.  Central-local relations and various territorial, and 
often conflicting, levels of authority contribute further to a fragmented polity. In 
sum, there is considerable competition among various social and economic 
interestst and groups stimulating the emergence of competitive 
authoritarianism. 
 
Good government 
Western political discourse often equates good government with democracy. 
However, Chinese sustained economic development and growth over more 
than three decades seem to refute this equation. China seems to prove that 
often authoritarian systems can distribute quickly and more efficiently than 
democratic system. Democracies focus on processes (elections) whereas 
they often forget outcomes. In a developing country struggling to come out of 
poverty outcomes (economic growth) often will appear to be more important 
than processes.  As Frances Fukuyama has indicated in his recent book, the 
key question is accountability or the quality of government.13 Transitologists 
neglect this discussion because they assume that once democracy has been 
achieved, legitimacy and accountability have automatically been achieved. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Developments in China over the last 30 years challenge the so-called 
transition paradigm. This paradigm posits that once a country moves away 
from dictatorial rule there is a linear process towards democracy and pluralism 
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(Brødsgaard  and Zheng 2004). The transition paradigm also assumes that 
authoritarian regimes are fragile due to weak legitimacy, too much focus on 
political oppression, over-centralization of the political decision-making 
process, and the dominance of personal power (patrimonialism) over 
institutional norms. 
 
On the surface, China fits the transition paradigm. There have been cracks in 
the system over the 30 year reform period and it is not difficult to discern 
between hardliners and softliners in the political discourse as it has unfolded 
among intellectuals, the state media and occasionally even among the top 
leaders. Importantly, direct elections for village heads have been instituted in 
the country side. Also there has been a process, where the economy and 
social and cultural norms increasingly have been modernized/ Westernized 
and traditional norms and values have been on the defensive. 
 
China has experienced significant change during the last 30 years. However, 
the reform process has not been linear; rather it has formed a zigzag pattern 
of two steps forward and one step back. The Chinese political regime should 
not be regarded as an incomplete or transitional form of democracy. It is a 
hybrid regime and as comparative political studies show such a regime can 
stay hybrid for a long time and prove rather immune to political change 
(Wheatley and Zurcher 2008).14 Clearly the Party still dominates the state and 
its main assets and even controls the commanding heights of the economy 
through the nomenklatura system. In fact the country seems to have entered 
a gray zone of “dominant-power politics” where it is neither clearly dictatorial 
not clearly heading towards democracy. So instead of regime breakdown, we 
see regime resilience – authoritarian resilience to use a concept borrowed 
from Andrew Nathan. 
 
At the same time competitive elements have been introduced and the 
prediction is that such competition will be expanded in the coming years. This 
is not necessarily part of a transition to democracy as transitologists would 
claim. It is rather part of a process of turning “resilient authoritarianism” into a 
kind of “competitive authoritarianism”, where more voices are allowed, but the 
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outcome is still determined by skewing the playing field in favour of the 
incumbent, i.e. the Chinese Communist Party. 
 
The Chinese political regime is overwhelming focused on stability. The core 
elite have succeeded in turning stability and harmony into the dominant 
ideological discourse and in the process it has acquired new legitimacy. The 
current global financial crisis will have negative consequences for the 
economic foundation of this stability and may create a new discourse of 
instability and danger. However, it appears likely that the Party-state for the 
time being will continue to be able to cope with such challenges. 
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